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In this paper, I analyze the behavior of public schools facing vouchers. The literature on the
eect of voucher programs on public schools typically focuses on student and mean school scores.
This paper tries to go inside the black box to investigate some of the ways in which schools facing
the threat of vouchers in Florida behaved. Florida schools getting an \F" grade are exposed to the
threat of vouchers, while vouchers are implemented if they get another \F" grade in the next three
years. Exploiting the institutional details of the 1999 program, I analyze the incentives built into the
system and investigate the behavior of the threatened public schools facing these incentives. There
is strong evidence that they did respond to incentives. Using highly disaggregated school level data,
a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy as well as a regression discontinuity analysis, I nd
that the threatened schools tended to focus more on students below the minimum criteria cutos
rather than equally on all, but interestingly, this improvement did not come at the expense of higher
performing students. Second, consistent with incentives, they focused mostly on writing rather than
reading and math. Finally, there is not much evidence of relative reclassication of low performing
students into special education categories exempt from the calculation of grades. This is consis-
tent with substantial costs associated with such reclassication during that period. These results
are robust to controlling for dierential pre-program trends, changes in demographic compositions,
mean reversion and sorting. These ndings have important policy implications and subsequent grad-
ing rule changes in Florida suggest that these changes have been a response to public school behavior.
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The concern over public school performance in the last two decades has pushed public school reform to
the forefront of policy debate in the United States. School accountability and school choice, and espe-
cially vouchers, are among the most hotly debated instruments of public school reform. Understanding
the behavior and response of public schools facing these initiatives is key to an eective policy design.
This paper takes an important step forward in that direction by analyzing public school behavior under
the Florida voucher program.
The Florida voucher program, known as the \opportunity scholarship" program, is unique in that
it embeds a voucher program within a school accountability system. Moreover, the federal No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) Act is similar to and largely modeled after the Florida program, which makes the
latter all the more interesting and relevant. Most studies to date, studying the eect of vouchers on
public schools, have looked at the eect on student and mean school scores. In contrast, this study
tries to go inside the black box to investigate some of the ways in which schools facing the voucher
program behaved in the rst three years after program.1 Exploiting the institutional details of the
Florida program during this period, it analyzes the incentives built into the system, and investigates
public school behavior and response facing these incentives.
The Florida voucher program, written into law in June 1999, makes all students of a school eligible
for vouchers if the school gets two \F" grades in a period of four years. Thus, the program can be
looked upon as a \threat of voucher" program|schools getting an \F" grade for the rst time are
threatened by vouchers, but vouchers are implemented only if they get another \F" grade in the next
three years. Vouchers are associated with a loss in revenue and also media publicity and visibility.
Therefore, the threatened schools have a strong incentive to try to avoid the second \F", and thereby
avoid vouchers. This paper studies some alternative ways in which the threatened schools responded,
facing the incentives built into the system.
Under the 1999 Florida grading criteria, certain percentages of a school's students had to score
above some specied cutos on the score scale for it to escape the second \F".2 Therefore the threatened
schools had an incentive to focus more on students expected to score just below these high stakes cutos
1 Under the Florida voucher program (described below), schools getting an \F" grade in 1999 were directly threatened
by vouchers, but this threat remained valid for the next three years only. Therefore, I study the behavior of the 1999
threatened schools during these three years.
2 The institutional details of the Florida program including the grading criteria are discussed in detail later. The Florida
grading criteria underwent some important changes in 2002, as described later.
1rather than equally on all students. Did this take place in practice? Second, to escape an F grade, the
schools needed to pass the minimum criteria in only one of the three subject areas of reading, math
and writing. Did this induce the threatened schools to concentrate more on one subject, rather than
equally on all? If so, which subject area did the schools choose to concentrate on? One alternative
would be to concentrate on the subject area closest to the cuto.3 But subject areas dier in the extent
of diculties, so it is not immediately obvious that it is easiest to pass the cuto in the subject area
closest to the cuto. Rather, schools are likely to weigh the extent of diculties of the dierent subjects
and their distances from the cutos, and choose the subject that is least costly to pass the cuto.
Third, according to Florida rules, scores of students in several special education categories (Exceptional
Student Education (ESE) categories) were not included in the computation of grades. As a result, did
the threatened schools tend to reclassify their low performing students into these \exempt" categories
so as to remove them from the relevant test-taking pool and articially boost scores?
In addition to analyzing the above questions, this study also tries to look at a broader picture. If
the threatened schools concentrated on students expected to score just below the high stakes cutos,
did their improvements come at the expense of higher performing ones? The grading rules in Florida
underwent some major changes in 2002. Did these 2002 policy changes bear any relationship to the
public school response to the 1999 program?
Using highly disaggregated school level Florida data from 1993 through 2002, and a dierence-in-
dierences analysis as well as a regression discontinuity analysis, I investigate the above issues. There
is strong evidence that public schools responded to the incentives built into the system. First, I nd
that the threatened schools concentrated more on students below and closer to the high stakes cutos,
rather than equally on all students. Note that, as discussed in detail later, this improvement of the
low performing students does not seem to have come at the expense of the higher performing students.
Rather, there seems to have been a rightward shift of the entire score distribution, with improvement
concentrated more in the score ranges just below the high stakes cuto. This pattern holds in all the
three subjects of reading, math and writing. Second, I nd that the threatened schools indeed focused
more on one subject area. They did not focus on the subject area closest to the cuto. Rather, they
concentrated on writing, irrespective of the distances of the subject areas from the high stakes cutos.
This is consistent with the perception among Florida administrators that writing scores are considerably
3 The cutos dier across subjects (as will be detailed below). Here \cuto" refers to the cuto in the corresponding
subject area.
2easier to improve than scores in reading or math. Finally, there is not much evidence that the threatened
schools resorted to reclassication into \exempt" ESE categories after the program. As discussed in
the paper, reclassication into ESE categories was associated with substantial costs during this period,4
which might have induced the schools to focus more on other, less costly alternatives. These results
are quite robust in that they withstand several sensitivity tests, and the results from the dierence-in-
dierences analysis are qualitatively similar to those obtained from the regression discontinuity analysis.
They are robust to controlling for pre-program trends, mean reversion, sorting, changes in demographic
compositions and other observable characteristics of schools.
These ndings strongly suggest that the threatened schools responded to incentives which in turn
imply that policy can be targeted to shape public school behavior. Interestingly, the 2002 policy
changes seem to have been largely a response to public school behavior. The new grading system gave
less weight to writing scores and more to reading and math scores. Moreover, while under the 1999
grading system, the F grade and movement to a D depended solely on the percentages of students
scoring below the minimum criteria cutos, the 2002 grading system also included the performance
of comparatively higher performing students, while continuing to emphasize the performance of lower
performing students. In contrast, the rules relating to the inclusion of the dierent special education
categories in grade formation did not change. These policy changes suggest that there have been an
interaction between public school response and policy in Florida.
This study is related to two strands of literature. The rst strand investigates whether schools facing
accountability systems and testing regimes respond by gaming the system in various ways. Cullen and
Reback (2002), Figlio and Getzler (2002) and Jacob (2005) show that schools facing such systems tend
to reclassify their low performing students as disabled in an eort to make them ineligible to contribute
to the school's aggregate test scores, ratings or grades. Jacob (2005) also nds evidence in favor of
teaching to the test, preemptive retention of students and substitution away from low-stakes subjects,
while Jacob and Levitt (2003) nd evidence in favor of teacher cheating. Figlio (2003) nds that low
performing students are given harsher punishments during the testing period than higher performing
students for similar crimes, once again in an eort to manipulate the test taking pool. Figlio and
Winicki (2005) nd that schools faced with accountability systems increase the caloric content of school
4 Among other things, described later, the \McKay Scholarship Program for Students with Disabilities" in Florida acted
as a major disincentive to such reclassication. Since this program makes every special education student in Florida public
schools eligible for vouchers, reclassication in to ESE categories is associated with a threat of loss of the corresponding
students.
3lunches on testing days in an attempt to boost performance.
While these papers study the response of public schools facing accountability systems, the present
paper studies public school response and behavior facing vouchers. Although there is considerable
evidence relating to the response of public schools facing accountability regimes, it would be instructive
to know how public schools behave facing vouchers, an alternative form of public school reform. This
study also uses a dierent estimation strategy than that used in the above literature. In addition to a
dierence-in-dierences strategy, this paper also uses a regression discontinuity analysis unlike that in
the above literature.
The second strand of literature that this paper is related to analyzes the eect of vouchers on
public school performance. Theoretical studies in this literature include McMillan (2002) and Nechyba
(2003). Modeling public school behavior, McMillan (2002) shows that under certain circumstances, pub-
lic schools facing vouchers may nd it optimal to reduce productivity. Nechyba (2003) shows that while
public school quality may show a small decline with vouchers under a pessimistic set of assumptions, it
will improve under a more optimistic set of assumptions.
Combining both theoretical and empirical analysis, Chakrabarti (2004) studies the impact of two
alternative voucher designs|Florida and Milwaukee|on public school performance. She nds that
voucher design matters|the \threat of voucher" design in the former has led to an unambiguous im-
provement of the treated public schools in Florida and this improvement is larger than that brought
about by traditional vouchers in the latter. Other empirical studies in this literature include Greene
(2001, 2003), Hoxby (2003a, 2003b), Figlio and Rouse (2004), Chakrabarti (2005) and West and Pe-
terson(2005).5 Greene (2001, 2003) nds positive eects of the Florida program on the performance
of treated schools. Analyzing the same program and using student level data from a subset of Florida
districts, Figlio and Rouse (2004) nd some evidence of improvement of the treated schools in the high
stakes state tests, but these eects diminish in the low stakes, nationally norm-referenced test. Using
student level data, West and Peterson (2005) study the eects of the revised Florida program (after
the 2002 changes) as well as the NCLB Act on test performance of students in Florida public schools.
They nd that the former program has had positive and signicant impacts on student performance,
but they nd no such eect for the latter. Based on case studies from visits to ve Florida schools (two
\F" schools and three \A" schools), Goldhaber and Hannaway (2004) present evidence that F schools
5 For a comprehensive review of this literature as well as other issues relating to vouchers, see Howell and Peterson
(2005), Hoxby (2003b) and Rouse (1998).
4focused on writing because it is the easiest to improve.6 Analyzing the Milwaukee voucher program,
Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) nd evidence of a positive productivity response to vouchers after the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruling of 1998. Following Hoxby (2003a, 2003b) in the treatment and control group
classication strategy, and using data for 1987-2002, Chakrabarti (2005b) nds that the shifts in the
Milwaukee voucher program in the late 1990's led to a higher improvement of the treated schools in the
second phase of the Milwaukee program than that in the rst phase.
Most of the above studies analyze the eect of dierent voucher programs on student and mean
school scores and document an improvement in these measures. This study, on the other hand, tries to
delve deeper so as to investigate where this improvement comes from. Analyzing the incentives built
into the system, it seeks to investigate some of the alternative ways in which the threatened schools in
Florida behaved. Chakrabarti (2004) and Figlio and Rouse (2004) analyze the issue of teaching to the
test, but they do not examine the forms of behavior that are of interest in this paper. Evidence on the
alternative forms of behavior of public schools facing vouchers is still sparse. This study seeks to ll
this important gap.
2 The Program and its Institutional Details
The Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program was signed into law in June 1999. Under this program,
all students of a public school become eligible for vouchers or \opportunity scholarships" if the school
gets two \F" grades in a period of four years. A school getting an \F" grade for the rst time is exposed
to the threat of vouchers, but its students do not become eligible for vouchers unless and until it gets
a second \F" within the next three years.
To understand the incentives created by the program, it is important to understand the Florida
testing system and school grading criteria.7 Following a eld test in the school year 1997, the FCAT
(Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test) reading and math tests were rst administered in 1998. The
FCAT writing test was rst administered in 1993. In the remainder of the paper, I refer to school years
by the calendar year of the spring semester. The reading and writing tests were given in grades 4, 8
and 10 and math tests in grades 5, 8 and 10. The FCAT reading and math scores were expressed in
6 Schools that received a grade of \A" in 1999 are referred to as \A" schools. Schools that received a grade of \F"
(\D") in 1999 will henceforth be referred to as \F" (\D") schools.
7 Since I am interested in the incentives faced by the threatened schools and this mostly depends on the criteria for
\F" grade and what it takes to move to a \D", I will focus on the criteria for F and D grades. Detailed descriptions of the
criteria for the other grades are available at http://schoolgrades.doe.org.
5a scale of 100-500. The state categorized students into ve achievement levels in reading and math
that corresponded to specic ranges on this raw score scale.8 The FCAT writing scores, on the other
hand, were expressed in a scale of 1-6. The Florida Department of Education reports the percentages
of students scoring at 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, ..., 6 in FCAT writing. For simplicity, as well as symmetry with
reading and math, I divide the writing scores into ve categories and call them levels 1-5. Scores 1 and
1.5 will together constitute level 1; scores 2 and 2.5 level 2; 3 and 3.5 level 3; 4 and 4.5 level 4; 5, 5.5
and 6 level 5. (The results in this paper are not sensitive to the denitions of these categories.)9 In the
remainder of the paper, for writing, level 1 will refer to scores 1 and 1.5 together; level 2 scores 2 and
2.5 together etc.; while 1, 2, 3, ..., 6 will refer to the corresponding raw scores.
The system of assigning letter grades to schools started in the year 1999,10 and they were based on
the FCAT reading, math and writing tests. The state designated a school an \F" if it failed to attain
the minimum criteria in all the three subjects of FCAT reading, math and writing, and a \D" if it
failed the minimum criteria in only one or two of the three subject areas. To pass the minimum criteria
in reading and math, at least 60% of the students had to score at level 2 and above in the respective
subject, while to pass the minimum criteria in writing, at least 50% had to score 3 and above. In the
remainder of the paper, I will use the word \cuto" and \minimum criteria cuto" interchangeably to
refer to these minimum criteria cutos (level 2 in reading and math and score 3 in writing).
While scores of all regular students were to be included in the computation of school grades, scores
of students in only a few exceptional student education (ESE) and limited English procient (LEP)
categories were included in the calculation of grades. Specically, ESE students belonging to the three
categories of speech impaired, gifted and hospital/homebound and LEP students with more than two
years in an ESOL (English for speakers of other languages) program were eligible to be included in
school grade computation. Since 1998, Florida classied the special education students into twenty-one
ESE categories,11 therefore scores of students in eighteen ESE categories were not eligible to be included
in the computation of grades.
8 Levels 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in grade 4 reading corresponded to score ranges 100-274, 275-298, 299-338, 339-385 and 386-500
respectively. Levels 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in grade 5 math corresponded to score ranges of 100-287, 288-325, 326-354, 355-394
and 395-500 respectively.
9 Dening the categories in alternative ways or considering the scores separately do not change the results.
10 Before 1999, schools were graded by a numeric system of grades, I-IV (I-lowest, IV-highest).
11 The twenty-one ESE categories were educable mentally handicapped, trainable mentally handicapped, orthopedically
handicapped, occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech impaired, language impaired, deaf or hard of hearing, visually
impaired, emotionally handicapped, specic learning disabled, gifted, hospital/homebound, profoundly mentally handi-
capped, dual-sensory impaired, autistic, severely emotionally disturbed, traumatic brain injured, developmentally delayed,
established conditions and other health impaired.
6The 1999 grading system was replaced by a new system in 2002. Although the denitions of the
achievement levels remained the same, the new system included learning gains of students in addition to
their level scores in the computation of grades. School grades A-F under the new system corresponded
to specic ranges on a point scale where higher points corresponded to higher grades. Under the 1999
grading system, the F grade and movement to a D depended solely on the percentages of students
scoring below the minimum criteria cutos. Under the new system, improving scores of low performing
students as well as students in other ranges of the score scale increased the total number of points
of schools and contributed towards a higher grade. Moreover, the new system gave more weight to
reading and math scores compared to writing scores. While higher scores of students in all the three
subjects|reading, math and writing|added to the total number of points, learning gains of students
in only reading and math added to the total number of points. The rules relating to the inclusion of
various special education categories in grade formation, however, did not change.
3 Theoretical Discussion
This section and subsections 3.1-3.3 explore the alternative ways of response of public schools facing
a Florida-type \threat of voucher" program and the 1999 grading system. Assume that there are n
alternative ways in which a public school can apply its eort. Quality q of the public school is given
by q = q(e1;e2;:::;en) where ei;i = f1;2;:::;ng, represents the eort of the public school in alternative
i. Assume that ei is non-negative for all i and that the function q is increasing and concave in all its
arguments. Any particular quality level q can be attained by multiple combinations of fe1;e2;:::;eng|
the public school chooses the combination that optimizes its objective function. Public school cost is
given by C = C(e1;e2;:::;en), where C is increasing and convex in its arguments.
The Florida \threat of voucher" program designates a quality cuto  q such that vouchers are im-
plemented if and only if the school fails to meet the cuto. A school deciding to meet the cuto can do
so in a variety of ways|its problem then is to choose the best possible way. More precisely, it faces the
following problem:
Minimize C = C(e1;e2;:::;en) subject to q(e1;e2;:::;en)   q
The public school chooses eort level ei















ei ] = 0, where  is the Lagrange multiplier and q(e
1;e
2;:::;e










7Thus the amounts of eort that the public school chooses to expend on the various alternatives
depend on the marginal costs and marginal returns from the alternatives. While it delegates higher
eorts to alternatives with higher marginal returns and/or lower marginal costs, the eort levels in
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mix are equal (and in turn equal to zero) at the chosen levels of eort. This paper empirically analyzes
the behavior of public schools and investigates what alternatives the public schools actually chose when
faced by the 1999 Florida \threat of voucher" program.
3.1 The Incentives Created by the System and Alternative Avenues of Public
School Responses
3.1.1 Focusing on Students below the Minimum Criteria Cutos
Given the Florida grading system, threatened public schools striving to escape the second \F" would
have an incentive to focus on students expected to score below the minimum criteria cutos.12 Marginal
returns from focusing on such students would be expected to be higher than that on a student expected
to score at a much higher level (say, level 4). If marginal costs are not too high, the threatened schools
should be expected to resort to such a strategy.
If schools indeed behave according to this incentive, then the percentage of students scoring at level
1 in reading and math would be expected to fall after the program as compared to the pre-program
period. In writing, the cuto level is 3 (rather than level 2 in reading and math). Therefore, while the
threatened schools would have an incentive to focus on students expected to score below 3, they would
be induced to focus more on students expected to score in level 2, since they are closer to the cuto
and hence easier to push over the cuto. So while a downward trend would be expected in both the
percentages of students scoring in levels 1 and 2, the fall should be more prominent in level 2.
12 Alternative ways to do this would be to target curriculum to low performing students, put more emphasis on the
basic concepts rather than advanced topics in class or repeating material already covered rather than moving quickly to
new topics.
83.1.2 Choosing between Subjects with Dierent Extents of Diculties Versus Focusing
on Subject Closer to the Cuto
As per the Florida grading criteria, the threatened schools needed to pass the minimum criteria in
only one of the three subjects to escape a second F grade. Therefore the schools had an incentive to
focus more on one particular subject area, rather than equally on all. Note that it is unlikely that the
concerned schools will focus exclusively on one subject area and completely neglect the others because
there is an element of uncertainty inherent in student performance and scores, the degree of diculty
of the test, etc. and schools surely have to answer to parents for such extreme behavior. But if they
behave according to incentives, it is likely that they will concentrate more on one subject area. The
question that naturally arises in this case is: which subject area will the threatened schools focus on?
One possibility is to focus more on the subject area closest to the cuto i.e. the subject area for
which the dierence between the percentage of students scoring below the cuto in the previous year
and the percentage required to pass the minimum criteria is the smallest.13 However, the subject areas
dier in terms of their extent of diculties, and hence the schools may nd it more worthwhile to focus
on a subject area farther from the cuto, which otherwise is easier to improve on. In other words, the
distance from the cuto has to be weighed against the extent of diculty or ease in a subject area, and
the eort that a school decides to put in will depend on both factors.
3.1.3 Reclassifying Low Performing Students into Exempt ESE Categories
Since reclassifying low performing students in to excluded ESE categories serves to articially lower the
percentage of students below the minimum criteria cutos, marginal returns from such a reclassication
are positive. However, there are costs associated with such a strategy. It has to be approved by the
parents, a group of experts (such as physicians, psychologists, etc.) and increased classication is
associated with increased special services. Moreover, too much classication may lead to investigations
or audits by the Florida Department of Education.
The McKay Scholarship program acts as a farther disincentive to this sort of reclassication. Created
in 1999 and fully implemented in the 2000-01 school year, this program makes every disabled Florida
public school student eligible for vouchers to move to a private school (religious or non-religious) or to
another public school. Thus reclassication of students in to special education categories is associated
13 As outlined earlier, the required percentage of students below cuto that would allow the school to pass the minimum
criteria in the respective subject is 40% in reading and math and 50% in writing.
9with a threat of loss of the student and the corresponding revenue. The threatened public schools will
resort to reclassication into excluded ESE categories only if the returns from it justify the associated
costs.
4 Data
The data for this study were obtained from the Florida Department of Education. These data in-
clude school-level data on mean test scores, grades, percentages of students scoring in dierent levels,
distribution of students in the various ESE categories, grade distribution of schools, socio-economic
characteristics of schools and school nances. In spite of being school level data, these data are highly
disaggregated|in addition to data on mean school scores, data are available on percentages of students
scoring in dierent ranges of the score scale for each of reading, math and writing. The ESE data not
only give information on total ESE membership, but data were also obtained on membership in each of
the ESE categories in each Florida school for all years under consideration.
School level data on the percentage of students scoring in each of the ve levels are available from
1999 to 2002 for both FCAT grade 4 reading and grade 5 math. In addition, data are available on
percentages of students scoring in levels 1 and 2 in 1998 for both reading and math. Data are also
available on mean scale scores and number of students tested for each of reading and math from 1998-
2002.
In grade 4 writing, data are available on the percentage of students scoring at 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4,
4.5, 5, 5.5 and 6. These data are available from 1994 to 1996 and again from 1999 to 2002. In addition,
data on mean scale scores in writing and number of students tested are available from 1994-2002. Data
on school grades are available from 1999 to 2002.
During the period 1993-1997, Florida classied the exceptional students into 15 categories: educable
mentally handicapped, trainable mentally handicapped, physically handicapped, physical/occupational
therapy part-time, speech/language/hearing part-time, speech/language/hearing, visually handicapped
part-time, visually handicapped, emotionally handicapped part-time, emotionally handicapped, specic
learning disability part-time, specic learning disability, gifted part-time, hospital/homebound part-
time and profoundly handicapped. The reported ESE categories changed in 1998. Starting from 1998
Florida classied students into 21 categories - educable mentally handicapped, trainable mentally handi-
capped, orthopedically handicapped, occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech impaired, language
10impaired, deaf or hard of hearing, visually impaired, emotionally handicapped, specic learning dis-
abled, gifted, hospital/homebound, profoundly mentally handicapped, dual-sensory impaired, autistic,
severely emotionally disturbed, traumatic brain injured, developmentally delayed, established condi-
tions and other health impaired. Detailed school level data on membership in each of the above ESE
categories are available from 1993-2002.
School level data on grade distribution (K-12) of students are available from 1993-2002. Data on
socio-economic characteristics include data on sex composition (1994-2002), race composition (1994-
2002) and percent of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches (1997-2002). School nance data
consist of several measures of school level and district level per pupil expenditures and are available for
the period 1993-2002.
5 Empirical Strategy
Under the Florida opportunity scholarship program, schools that received a grade of \F" in 1999 were
directly threatened by the program in that all their students would be eligible for vouchers if the school
received another \F" grade in the next three years. These schools will constitute my treated group of
schools and will be referred to as \F schools" from now on. The schools that received a \D" in 1999 were
closest to the F schools in terms of grade, but were not directly threatened by the program. They will
constitute my control group of schools and will be referred to as \D schools" in the rest of the paper.
Given the nature of the Florida program, the threat faced by the 1999 F schools would be applicable for
the next three years only. Therefore, I study the behavior of the F schools (relative to the D schools)
during the rst three years of the program (that is, upto 2002).
5.1 Focusing on Students below the Minimum Criteria
As discussed above, if the treated schools tend to focus more on students they anticipate to score below
the minimum criteria cutos, the percentage of students scoring in level 1 in F schools in reading and
math should exhibit a decline relative to D schools. In FCAT writing, although relative declines are
likely in both levels 1 and 2, the relative decline in level 2 would be larger than in level 1, if the treated
schools responded to incentives.
To investigate whether the F schools resorted to such behavior, I look for shifts in the percentages
of students scoring in the dierent levels (1-5) for the F schools relative to the D schools in the post-
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(1)
where Pijt denotes the percentage of students in school i scoring in level j in year t; F is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 for F schools and 0 for D schools; Lj;j = f1;2;3;4;5g are level dummies that
take a value of 1 for the corresponding level, 0 otherwise; Dk;k = f2000;2001;2002g are year dummies
for years 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively. The variables (Dk  Lj) control for post-program common
year eects and Xijt denote the set of control variables. Control variables include race, sex, percentage
of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditure and interaction of the
level dummies with each of these variables. The coecients on the interaction terms (F  Dk  Lj)
represent the program eects on the F schools in each of the ve levels and in each of the three years
after the program. I also run the xed eects counterparts of this regression which includes school xed
eects (and hence has one less level dummy and one less interaction between level dummy and treated
dummy). These regressions are run for each of the subject areas|reading, math and writing.
5.1.1 Existence of Pre-Program Trends
The above estimates of the program eects will be biased if there are dierential pre-program trends
between F and D schools in the various levels. Using pre-program data, I next investigate the presence
of such pre-program trends. In FCAT writing, pre-program data on percentage of students scoring in
each of the dierent levels are available for the years 1994-1997. In FCAT reading and math, data on
percentage of students scoring in levels 1 and 2 are available for the pre-program years 1998 and 1999.14
To investigate the issue of pre-existing trends, I estimate the following regression as well as its xed
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where t denotes time trend, j = f1;2;3;4;5g for writing and j = f1;2g for reading and math. The
coecients of interest here are 3j.
14 Data on percentage of students in all the ve levels are available only from 1999.
125.1.2 Mean Reversion
Another concern here is mean reversion. Mean reversion is the statistical tendency whereby high and
low scoring schools tend to score closer to the mean subsequently. Since the F schools were by denition
the lowest scoring schools in 1999, it is natural to think that any decrease in the percentage of students
in these levels (level 1 in reading and math; levels 1 and 2 in writing) after the program is contaminated
by mean reversion. However, since I do a dierence-in-dierences analysis, my estimates of the program
eect will be contaminated only if the F schools revert to a greater extent towards the mean than the
D schools.
I use the following strategy to check for mean reversion in level 1. The idea is to measure the extent
of decline, if any, in the percentage of students scoring in level 1 (in reading and math) in the schools
that received an F grade in 1998 relative to the schools that received a D grade in 1998, during the
period 1998-99. Since this was the pre-program period, this gain can be taken as the mean-reversion
eect in level 1 for F schools relative to the D schools, and can be subtracted from the program eects
previously calculated to arrive at mean reversion corrected eects. A similar strategy can be used to
check mean reversion in the other levels.
The system of assigning letter grades to schools started in Florida in 1999. However, using the 1999
state grading criteria and the percentages of students scoring below the minimum criteria in the three
subjects (reading, math and writing) in 1998, I was able to assign F and D grades in 1998. These
schools will henceforth be referred to as 98F and 98D schools respectively.15 Using this sample of 98F
and 98D schools, I investigate the relative changes, if any, in the percentage of students scoring in levels
1 and 2 for the 98F schools (relative to the 98D schools) during 1998-99.16
15 Note that the mean percentages of students in the dierent levels in F and D schools in 1999 are very similar
respectively to the corresponding mean percentages in 98F and 98D schools in 1998, which attests to the validity of this
approach.
16 Note that mean reversion in only levels 1 and 2 (in reading and math) can be assessed using this method, since data
on percentages in the other levels are not available for 1998. Data on percentages in the dierent levels in writing are not
available for 1998, which precludes the use of this method in writing. While data are available for the pre-program years
1994-97 in writing, the FCAT reading and math tests were not given then. Therefore, there is no way to impute F and
D grades to schools in those years using the 1999 grading criteria. However, I also do a regression discontinuity analysis
which serves to get rid of this problem (if any).
135.1.3 Using Regression Discontinuity Analysis to Examine the Dierential Focus on Stu-
dents below Minimum Criteria
The issue of mean reversion arises here from the concern that the F schools may revert towards the
mean to a greater extent than D schools just by virtue of their relatively low performance in 1999.
Therefore regression discontinuity analysis, comparing schools in a narrow range on either side of the
cuto between F and D schools provides a useful way to get around the problem of mean reversion. The
Florida program created a highly non-linear and discontinuous relationship between the percentage of
students scoring above a pre-designated threshold and the probability that the school's students become
eligible for vouchers in the near future which enables the use of such a strategy.
Consider the sample of F and D schools where both failed to meet the minimum criteria in reading
and math in 1999. In this sample, only F schools failed the minimum criteria in writing also, while
D schools passed it. Therefore, in this sample the probability of treatment varies discontinuously as a
function of the percentage of students scoring at or above 3 in 1999 FCAT writing. There exists a sharp
cuto at 50%|while schools below 50% faced a direct threat, those above 50% did not face any such
direct threat.
Using the sample of F and D schools that fail minimum criteria in both reading and math in 1999,
Figure 5 Panel A illustrates the relationship between assignment to treatment (i.e. facing the threat
of vouchers) and the schools' percentages of students scoring at or above 3 in FCAT writing. The
gure shows that except one, all schools in this sample that had less than 50% of their students scoring
below 3 received an F grade. Similarly, all schools (except one) in this sample that had 50% or a larger
percentage of their students scoring at or above 3 were assigned a D grade. Note that many of the dots
correspond to more than one school,|Figure 5, Panel B illustrates the same relationship where the
sizes of the dots are proportional to the number of schools at that point. The smallest dot corresponds
to one school. These two panels show that in this sample, percentage of students scoring at or above 3
in writing uniquely predicts (except two schools) assignment to treatment and there is a discrete change
in the probability of treatment at the 50% mark.
Ranking schools in terms of percentage of students scoring at and above 3 in FCAT writing, I rst
consider schools that lie within 7 percentage points of the 50% threshold and refer to it as discontinuity
sample 1. Next, I further shrink the sample and pick schools that lie within a 5 percentage point range
of the cuto and call it discontinuity sample 2. Using each of these samples, I investigate whether the
14F schools exhibit dierential shifts in the percentage of students scoring in the various levels in the post
program period. For this purpose, I estimate model (1) using each of these samples, except that the
OLS regressions also include a smooth polynomial17 in the selection variable, percentage of students
scoring at or above 3 in FCAT writing.
I also consider two corresponding discontinuity samples where both F and D schools fail the minimum
criteria in reading and writing (math and writing). F schools fail the minimum criteria in math (reading)
also, unlike D schools. In these samples, the probability of treatment changes discontinuously as a
function of the percentage of students scoring at or above level 2 in math (reading) and there is a sharp
cuto at 60%.
5.1.4 Compositional Changes of Schools and Sorting
School level data brings with it the hazards of potential compositional changes of schools. In the presence
of such changes, the program eects will be biased if the F schools were characterized by dierent
compositional changes than the D schools. I investigate this issue further by examining whether the F
schools exhibited dierential shifts in demographic compositions after the program.
Another related issue is student sorting which can, once again, bias the results. None of the threat-
ened schools received a second \F" grade in 2000 or 2001, therefore none of their students became eligible
for vouchers. Therefore the concern about vouchers leading to sorting is not applicable here. However,
the F and D grades can lead to a dierential sorting of students in these two types of schools.18 If there
is evidence of a decline in percentage of students in lower levels in F schools relative to D schools, this
would be driven by sorting only if the F schools faced a relative ight of low performing students and a
relative inux of high performing students in comparison to the D schools. There is no a priori reason
as to why this might happen.
However, to investigate this issue further as well as to directly address the potential problem of
changes in school composition, I examine whether the demographic composition of the F schools saw a
relative shift after the program as compared to the pre-program period. Using data from 1994-2002, I
estimate the following regression (as well as its xed eects counterpart):
yit = 0 + 1F + 2t + 3(F  t) + 4v + 5(v  t) + 6(F  v) + 7(F  v  t) + "it (3)
17 I experiment with three forms of the polynomial: a quadratic, a cubic and a quartic.
18 Figlio and Lucas (2004) nd that following the rst assignment of school grades in Florida, the better students
dierentially selected into schools receiving grades of \A", though this dierential sorting tapered o over time.
15where yit represents the demographic characteristic of school i in year t and v is the program dummy,
v = 1 if year> 1999 and 0 otherwise. This regression investigates whether there has been any relative
shift in demographic composition of the F schools in the post-program period after controlling for pre-
program trends and post-program common shocks. The coecients in the interaction terms (F v) and
(F  v  t) capture the relative intercept and trend shifts of the F schools.
5.1.5 The Problem of Underestimation: Are D Schools Untreated?
The computation of treatment eects above assumes that the D schools are not treated by the program.
Although D schools do not directly face the threat of vouchers, they are close to getting an \F" and
hence are likely to face an indirect threat. In such a case, the program eects shown above (both
dierence-in-dierences and regression discontinuity estimates) would be underestimates. Note that
this problem is likely to be more prominent in the regression discontinuity analysis.
To get around this problem, I rescale the eects obtained in the previous analyses by the dierence
in the probabilities of treatment of F and D schools, that is by calculating the corresponding Wald
estimator.19 I use pre-program data to calculate the probabilities that F and D schools respectively
would fall into treatment the next year. These scaling factors are calculated both for the full sample of
F and D schools and the discontinuity samples.
A problem here is that the system of assigning letter grades started in 1999. However, as described
in section (5.1.2), I was able to assign F and D grades in 1998 using the state grading criteria and 1998
school scores. Using this sample of 98F and 98D schools and data on school grades in 1999, I calculate
the above probabilities.20 To calculate these probabilities for the discontinuity samples, I consider the
set of schools that failed the minimum criteria in all three subject areas in 1998 (the 98F schools), and
the set of 98D schools that failed the minimum criteria in reading and math in 1998, but passed the
minimum criteria in writing. Ranking these schools in terms of their percentages of students scoring at
and above 3 in 1998 FCAT writing, I consider the schools within a range of 5 (7) percentage points
of the 50% cuto for discontinuity sample 2 (discontinuity sample 1), and calculate the probabilities
that these groups of 98F and 98D schools would fall into treatment the next year.
19 I would like to thank Caroline Hoxby for suggesting this strategy.
20 Note that 1998 is the rst year that such grades can be calculated. This is because (after a eld test in 1997) the
FCAT reading and math tests were rst administered in 1998.
165.2 Choosing between Subjects with Dierent Extents of Diculties Versus Focus-
ing on Subjects Closer to the Cuto
For each F school, I rst rank the subject areas in terms of their distances from the respective subject
cutos. Distance of a subject from the respective subject cuto is dened as the dierence between the
percentage of students scoring below the cuto in that subject in 1999 and the percentage required to
pass the minimum criteria in that subject. Next, based on the ranks of the subjects, I generate three
dummies, \low", \mid" and \high". \Low" takes a value of 1 if the subject is closest to the cuto,
0 otherwise; \mid" takes a value of 1 if the subject is second in terms of distance from the cuto, 0
otherwise; \high" takes a value of 1 if the subject is farthest from the cuto, 0 otherwise. The analysis in
this section will combine the reading, math and writing scores (percent scoring below minimum criteria)
in a single model. Therefore, for purposes of analysis in this section, I standardize the reading, math
and writing scores by grade, subject and year to have means of 0 and standard deviations of 1.
Using the sample of F schools and data from 1999 and 2000, I estimate the following model:
yist = 0read + 1math + 2write + 3low + 4mid + 5(read  D00) + 6(math  D00) + 7(write 
D00) +8(low  D00) +9(mid  D00) +10Xist +"ist (4)
where yist represents the percentage of students below minimum criteria cuto (standardized by grade,
subject and year) in school i subject s in year t; read, math and write are subject dummies that take a
value of 1 for the corresponding subject and 0 otherwise; and Xist denotes the set of control variables.
Control variables include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real
per pupil expenditure and interactions of the subject dummies with these variables. High is taken to
be the omitted category. The coecients 5   9 capture the program eects. If the F schools focused
on subject areas on the basis of their distances from the cuto then 8, 9 < 0 and j8j > j9j. On the
other hand, if the schools choose to focus on a certain subject area, then the coecient of the interaction
term between that subject and 2000 year dummy will be negative and larger in magnitude than the
other corresponding interaction terms.
I next explore these issues further by disaggregating the above eects. If the F schools choose to
focus on the subject closest to the cuto, then do they concentrate on the \low" subject irrespective of
whether it is reading, math or writing or does the response in the \low" subject depends on the specic
subject area? On the other hand, if they choose to focus on one subject area because of its relative
ease, do they focus on it irrespective of its rank? To investigate these questions, I estimate the following
17model (as well as the xed eects counterpart of it). The coecients of interest here are 5   13.
yist = 0read + 1math + 2write + 3low + 4mid + 5(low  D00  read) + 6(low  D00  math) +
7(lowD00write)+8(midD00read)+9(midD00math)+10(midD00write)+11(high
D00read)+12(highD00math)+13(highD00write)+14Xist +"ist (5)
5.3 Reclassifying Low Performing Students into Exempt ESE Categories
This section describes the strategies I use to investigate whether F schools resorted to dierential
classication in to ESE categories after the program.
5.3.1 Looking for Shifts in Total ESE Classication
The dependent variable for this analysis is percentage ESE membership, i.e., total ESE membership as
a percentage of total enrollment. After controlling for pre-program trends and post-program common
shocks, I look for relative shifts in this variable in F schools after the program. Using data from
1998-2002, I begin with the following model:
peit = c + 0F + 1t + 2(F  t) + 3v + 4(v  t) + 5(F  v) + 6(F  v  t) + 7Xit + "it (6)
where peit represents percentage ESE membership in school i in year t; v is the program dummy; (F t)
allows for dierential pre-program trend of F schools; v and (v  t) control for post-program common
intercept and trend shifts and Xit includes the set of school characteristics. The coecients on the
interaction terms (F  v) and (F  v  t) estimate the program eects - 5 gives the intercept shift and
6 the trend shift. Note that this specication constrains the post-program F school year eects to be
homogeneous over time.
Next, I estimate an unrestricted model that no longer constrains the post-program year-to-year
changes in F schools to be equal and allows for heterogeneous-in-time treatment eects.
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where D1 = 1 if year  1999, and 0 otherwise, and F  D1 controls for any dierential pre-program
year eects of F schools. The coecients 2j represent the eect of the program on the rate of ESE
classication one, two and three years into the program. I also estimate the xed eects counterpart of
each of the above regressions.
185.3.2 Looking for Shifts in Classication in Excluded Categories relative to Included
Categories
While trends in total ESE classication provide a summary picture, they are unlikely to provide a
conclusive picture in terms of whether or not the F schools resorted to such reclassication of students.
For example, absence of shifts in total ESE classication does not rule out the possibility that relative
reclassication in excluded categories took place in the F schools. Similarly, positive shifts in total ESE
classication does not necessarily imply an increase in classication in excluded categories. To have a
closer look, I look for post-program shifts in classication in Excluded categories relative to Included
categories in F schools, in comparison to D schools. Using data on percentage of total enrollment
classied in Excluded and Included categories for F and D schools during 1998 through 2002, I estimate
the following model:
zijt = constant+0Exempt+1t+2F +3(Exemptt)+4(ExemptF) +5(F t)+6(Exempt
F  t) + 7v + 8(Exempt  v) + 9(v  t) + 10(F  v) + 11(Exempt  v  t) + 12(Exempt  F  v) +
13(F  v  t) + 14(Exempt  F  v  t) + 15Xijt + "ijt (8)
where zijt indicates the total percentage of students in school i classied in category j in year t,
j =fExcluded, Includedg, \Exempt" is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for excluded categories
and 0 otherwise, Xijt includes the set of school characteristics and interactions of \Exempt" dummy
with these variables. The coecients of interest here are 12 and 14|they capture any dierential post-
program intercept and trend shifts for F schools relative to D schools in excluded categories (relative to
included categories), after controlling for pre-program trends and post-program common shocks. I also
estimate a model that allows for heterogenous-in-time treatment eects:
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The coecients of interest here are 8k, they capture the eect of the program on classication in
excluded categories relative to included categories in F schools after one, two and three years after the
program.
5.3.3 Classication in Mutable Excluded and Included Categories
The ESE categories vary in the extent of their severities. While some categories such as those with
observable or severe disabilities or physical handicaps are comparatively non-mutable, others such as
19learning disabilities and emotionally handicapped/disturbed are much more mild and comparatively
mutable categories.21. Classication in these latter categories often has a large amount of subjective
element to it and is hence easy to be manipulated. So if reclassication into excluded categories did
take place, it is most likely to have taken place in these categories. Using data from 1998-2002 and
models (8) and (9), I look for post-program shifts in classication in these mutable categories relative
to included categories in the F schools (relative to D schools). \Exempt" is now a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 for learning disabled (or emotionally handicapped) and 0 otherwise.
5.3.4 Existence of Dierential Pre-Program Trends in ESE Classication
The denition of some of the ESE categories changed in 1998, so that the categories in the pre-1998
period are not directly comparable to those in 1998-2002. Therefore, the above analysis includes two
pre-program years: 1998 and 1999. In spite of changes in denitions, analysis of the pre-1998 data can
provide us with some idea about dierential pre-program trends and whether they are likely to be a
major problem. Data on ESE classication in the pre-1998 period are available for 1993-97. Using these
data I look for any dierential trend in F schools in total ESE classication, relative classication into
excluded categories as compared to included categories and relative classication in learning disabled
(emotionally handicapped) categories compared to included categories.22
5.3.5 Using Regression Discontinuity Analysis to Investigate Relative Post-Program Shifts
in ESE Classication in Florida
As outlined earlier, the design of the Florida program permits the use of this quasi-experimental design
in analyzing the treatment eects in Florida. Regression discontinuity analysis serves to compare F
and D schools within a narrow range of the cuto between F and D. I use the same two discontinuity
samples here as in section (5.1.3),|discontinuity sample 1 and discontinuity sample 2. The F and D
schools in the discontinuity samples are very similar to each other (see table 4). Therefore regression
discontinuity analysis promises to give more precise results on the relative classication, if any, in to
ESE categories by the F schools and consistency of these results with those from the entire sample of F
21 See Cullen (2003), Singer et. al. (1989) and Figlio and Getzler (2002)
22 Learning disabled and emotionally handicapped categories were comparable in the two periods. However, while speech
language and hearing impaired were reported as a single category in the earlier period, they were reported as separate
categories in the latter period. Speech impaired is an included category under Florida law, while hearing and language
impaired are not. Therefore the included categories cannot be completely separated from the excluded categories in the
pre-1998 period. (The denition of the other included categories remained the same.) While interpreting the results from
this analysis, this caveat should be kept in mind.
20and D schools would attest to the robustness of the results.
Using the above two discontinuity samples, I look at the same three issues as in sections (5.3.1)-
(5.3.3). Do the F schools in the discontinuity samples show a relative shift in total ESE classication
after the program? Is there an increased classication in to excluded categories relative to included
categories in F schools after the program? Is there an increased classication in the mutable excluded
categories relative to included categories?
5.3.6 Using Change in Percentage of Students Tested to Investigate the Issue of Increased
Classication into ESE Categories
Reclassication of low performing students into excluded ESE categories so as to remove them from the
test-taking pool would lead to a decrease in the percentage of students tested in Florida.23 Therefore, I
analyze the patterns in percent of students tested in F and D schools before and after the program. More
precisely, using data for reading, math and writing for 1998-2002 and after controlling for pre-program
dierences in trends and post-program common shocks, I look for any post-program shifts in percent of
students tested in F schools (relative to D schools) in each of the subjects.
5.3.7 Reclassication into ESE categories: Are the above estimates underestimates?
As discussed in section (5.1.5), D schools are likely to be aected by the program as they are close
to getting an \F". In such a case, the dierence-in-dierences estimates of classication into ESE
categories, and especially the regression discontinuity estimates, are likely to be underestimates. To
circumvent this problem, I use the strategy described in section (5.1.5), and scale the treatment eects
by the corresponding dierences in the probabilities of treatments of F and D schools.
6 Results
6.1 Did the Threatened Schools Focus on Students Expected to Score below the
Cutos? Investigating Shifts in Percentages Scoring below the Cutos
This section looks for post-program shifts in the percentages of students scoring in the various levels
for F schools in comparison to D schools. Figure 1 shows the distribution of percentage of students
scoring below the minimum criteria cutos in F and D schools in 1999 and 2000 in the three subject
23 Increased classication accompanied by an increased percentage of regular students tested can in principle keep the
percentage of students tested the same. However, it is not obvious that such a condition will hold in practice. See footnote
29.
21areas of reading, math and writing. 1999 is the last pre-program year and 2000 the rst post-program
year. Panels A and B (C and D) look at the distribution in level 1 reading (level 1 math) in the two
years respectively, while panels E and F look at the distributions in level 2 writing in 1999 and 2000
respectively. In each of reading, math and writing, the graphs show a relative leftward shift of the F
school distribution in comparison to the D school distribution in 2000. This suggests that the F schools
were characterized by a greater fall in the percentage of students scoring in level 1 reading, level 1 math
and level 2 writing after the program.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of reading, math and writing scores by treatment status in 1999 and
2000. In each of reading and math, there is a fall in the percentage of students scoring in level 1 in F
schools relative to D schools in 2000. In writing, on the other hand, while there are relative falls in both
levels 1 and 2 in F schools, the fall in level 2 is much more prominent than the fall in level 1. Another
important feature|seen in all reading, math and writing|is that there is a general relative rightward
shift in the F distribition in 2000, with changes most concentrated in the crucial levels.
I next investigate whether these patterns continue to hold in a more sophisticated regression analysis
also. Table 1 presents results on the eect of the program on percentage of students scoring in levels
1-5 in FCAT reading, math and writing. Using model 1, columns (1)-(2) look at the eect in reading,
columns (3)-(4) in math and columns (5)-(6) in writing. For each set, the rst column reports the
results from OLS estimation and the second column from xed eects estimation. All regressions are
weighted by the number of students tested and control for race, sex, percentage of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditure and interactions of each of these variables with
level dummies.
In reading, both OLS and FE estimates show relative decline in percentage of students in level 1 in
F schools in each of the three years after the program.24 On the other hand, there are increases in the
percentage of students scoring in levels 2, 3 and 4. The level 1, 2 and 3 eects are always statistically
signicant (except level 2 in rst year), while level 4 eects never are. The level 5 percentages saw
a statistically signicant decline, but the magnitudes never exceeded 1%. Moreover, the changes in
24 Although the state still continued to grade the Florida schools on a scale of A though F, the grading criteria underwent
some important changes in 2002, as described earlier. So a natural question that arises here is whether the 2002 eects
(that is, the eects in the third year after program) were induced by the 1999 program or were also contaminated by
the eect of the 2002 changes. However, these new grading rules were announced in December 2001 and were extremely
complicated combining student learning gains in addition to level scores. Since the FCAT tests were held in February and
March 2002, just a couple of months after the announcement, it is unlikely that the 2002 eects were contaminated by
responses to the 2001 announcement. Moreover, the results are very similar if the year 2002 is dropped and the analysis
is repeated with data through 2001.
22level 1 percentages always economically (and in most cases, statistically) exceed the changes in each of
the other levels in each of the three years after the program. These patterns are consistent with the
hypothesis that in reading schools chose to focus more on students they expected to score below the
minimum criteria cuto.
The results in math (columns (3)-(4)) are similar. There is a steep and statistically signicant
decline in the percentage of students scoring in level 1, in each of the three years after the program.
Levels 2, 3 and 4 percentages increase, most of which are statistically signicant. Level 5 on the other
hand saw a small decline, though the eects are not statistically signicant in most cases. Once again,
the decline in the level 1 percentages exceed the changes in the other levels, both economically and
statistically.
Columns (5)-(6) present the results for writing. The percentages of students scoring in both levels
1 and 2 saw a decline after the program. But interestingly, the decline in level 2 is larger (both
economically and statistically) than in level 1, as would be dictated by the incentives created by the
program. In writing, there is no evidence of a fall in the percentage of students scoring in level 5.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show the trends in the percentages of students scoring in levels 1-5 in reading, math
and writing respectively. Consistent with the results obtained above, there is a large decline in the
percentage of students scoring in level 1 in each of reading and math which exceeds the changes in the
other levels. In writing, on the other hand, the decline is considerably larger in level 2 than in level 1,
once again in conformity with the above regression results.
The patterns in reading, math and writing support the hypothesis that the F schools chose to
focus more on students they expected to score below the minimum criteria cutos. More importantly,
consistent with the incentives created by the program, while the declines in reading and math are
concentrated in level 1, the decline in writing is most prominent in level 2, rather than level 1. The
cutos in reading and math were level 2, which justify the declines in level 1. On the other hand, the
writing cuto of 3 induced the F schools to concentrate more on students expected to score in level 2
(i.e. closer to the cuto) than in level 1. These evidences strongly suggest that the threatened schools
focused on students expected to score below and close to the high stakes cutos.
A question that naturally arises in this context is whether the improvements of the lower performing
students came at the expense of the higher performing ones. There is no evidence of such a pattern
in math or writing (except in the rst year after program in math). In reading and in rst year math
23there is a statistically signicant decline in the percentage of students in level 5, but the eects are very
small, always being less than 1% in magnitude. I later investigate whether this pattern continues to
hold under a more precise regression discontinuity analysis.
Looking for Pre-Existing Trends
The results in Table 1 would be biased if there are pre-existing trends in the percentage of students
scoring in the dierent levels in F schools relative to D schools. Table 2 investigates this issue. As
discussed earlier, while pre-program data on the percentage of students in various levels are available
for all levels in writing (1994-97), they are available for only levels 1 and 2 in reading and math (1998-
99).25 Columns (1)-(2) report the results in reading, (3)-(4) in math and (5)-(6) in writing. The rst
column in each set reports the results from OLS estimation, the second from xed eects estimation.
There is no evidence of any dierential trends in F schools relative to D schools in any of the levels and
in any of the subject areas. Therefore it is unlikely that the previous results are biased by pre-program
trends.
Mean Reversion
This section addresses the concern that the results reported in Table 1 may be biased by mean reversion.
Using the strategy described in section 5.1.2, Table 3 reports the results for mean reversion in reading
(columns (1)-(3)) and math (columns (4)-(6)).
Relative to the 98D schools, there is no evidence of mean reversion of the 98F schools in either
reading or math and in either level 1 or level 2. As discussed earlier, the absence of relevant data
in writing precludes the examination of mean reversion in writing using this method. However, the
regression discontinuity analysis in the next section serves to get rid of this problem, if any.
Regression Discontinuity Analysis: Examining Focus on Students below Cutos
I use the two discontinuity samples as described in section 5.1.3, - discontinuity sample 1 (7) and
discontinuity sample 2 (5). The summary characteristics of the F and D schools in these samples
are reported in Table 4. All these numbers pertain to the pre-program year, 1999. The F and D
schools are strikingly similar to each other in terms of various demographic characteristics (race, sex
and percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches), ESE categorization (percentage
of enrollment in all ESE categories together, percentage in excluded ESE categories, percentage in
included ESE categories), real per pupil expenditure, mean scores (FCAT reading, math and writing)
25 Data on percentage of students in all the ve levels in reading and math are available in 1999, but not before that.
24and number of students tested. Using discontinuity sample 2, Figure 6, panels C-E show the eects
of the program on percentage of students scoring in levels 1, 3 and 5 in reading, one year after the
program. Panels F-H show the corresponding eects in reading two years after program. In both years,
the percentage of students scoring in level 1 dropped sharply around the 50% cuto (panels C and F)
implying that the program led to a decline in the percentage of students scoring in level 1. Breaks are
also visible in level 3 for both years 2000 and 2001 (Panels D and G), but these are considerably smaller
in magnitude than the level 1 breaks. There is no evidence of any break in the relationship in level 5
around the 50% cuto.
Figure 7, Panels A-C show the eect of the program on percentage of students scoring in levels 1, 3
and 5 in math one year after program. Panels D-F show the corresponding eects in math two years
after program. Panels G-I show the eect of the program on percentage of students scoring in levels 1,
2 and 3 in writing one year after the program (2000). (The graphs for 2002 in reading and math and
for 2001 and 2002 in writing are similar to those in the other years for the corresponding subject and
hence omitted.)26
In math, there is a sharp drop in the percentages of students scoring in level 1 close to the 50%
cuto in both the rst and second years after program. Once again, breaks are visible in level 3 in both
years in math, though they are much smaller than the corresponding level 1 breaks. While there is no
evidence of any discontinuity in level 5 in 2000, there is evidence of a small break in relationship in
2001. (Note that the scales in the level 5 graphs are dierent from those in levels 1 and 2.) In writing,
on the other hand, while drops are visible in both levels 1 and 2 around the 50% cuto, the drop in
level 2 is substantially larger than that in level 1.
I next examine whether these patterns continue to hold in a more rigorous analysis. Using discon-
tinuity samples 1 and 2, Table 5 looks at the eect of the program on percentage of students scoring
in dierent levels in F schools relative to D schools. The regressions report results from xed eects
regressions corresponding to model 1. The results from OLS are similar and hence not reported,|the
OLS regressions also include a polynomial in the selection variable, the percentage of students scoring at
or above level 3 in FCAT writing. I have experimented with three forms of the polynomial,- a quadratic,
a cubic and a quartic - the results remain qualitatively similar for the dierent forms of the polynomial.
26 The gures for the other levels are omitted for lack of space, they tally with the results reported in Table 5. All these
graphs pertain to discontinuity sample 2, those for discontinuity sample 1 are qualitatively similar and correspond to the
results in Table 5.
25These results are available on request.
In each of reading and math, for each of the discontinuity samples and in each of the three years
after the program, the F schools show a relative decline in the percentage of students scoring in level 1.
These eects are statistically signicant in all cases (except rst year reading) and these eects always
exceed the eects in the other levels. In addition, these eects are similar to the corresponding level
1 eects in the full sample of F and D schools. In writing, although the eects are somewhat smaller
than that in the full sample, they are still economically large and statistically signicant. The pattern
also remains the same|the level 2 eects in each of the three years after the program and for each of
the discontinuity samples exceed the corresponding level 1 eects. Moreover, the level 2 eects always
exceed the changes in the other levels. These patterns conrm the earlier results and provide additional
evidence that the threatened public schools concentrated more on the students expected to score below
and close to the minimum criteria cutos.
A related question here is whether the improvement of the low performing students came at the
expense of the higher performing ones. The previous dierence-in-dierences analysis showed some
evidence of a small (less than 1%) decline in percentage of students scoring in level 5 reading and rst
year math, but there was no such evidence in writing or in the other years in math. But, as seen
in table 5, the declines in reading and rst year math no longer survive in the more precise regression
discontinuity analysis. In fact, there is no evidence that the improvements of the low performing students
came at the expense of the higher performing ones and there is even some evidence of a small increase
in percentage of students in level 5 writing.
To sum up, there is strong evidence that the threatened schools concentrated more on low performing
students (i.e., students expected to score below and close to the minimum criteria cutos) and the
declines in the percentages of students just below the minimum criteria cutos exceeded the changes in
percentages at all other ranges of the score scale. This pattern holds in all the three subjects|reading,
math and writing. But there is no evidence that the increased focus of attention on the lower performing
students adversely aected the higher performing ones. Rather, there seems to have been a rightward
shift of the entire score distribution in each of reading, math and writing, although the improvements
were concentrated in score ranges just below the respective minimum criteria cutos.
Sorting
Another factor that might potentially bias the results is sorting. To investigate this issue, I analyze the
26trends in the demographic composition of schools and investigate whether the program led to a shift in
the demographic composition of the F schools relative to the D schools. Table 6 presents the estimation
results for specication (6). The results reported include school xed eects, the corresponding results
from OLS are very similar and hence omitted. There is no evidence of any shift in the various demo-
graphic variables except for a modest positive intercept shift for Hispanics. However, if anything, this
would lead to underestimates of the program eects. Moreover, the regressions in the paper control for
any change in demographic composition. To sum, it is unlikely that the patterns seen above are driven
by sorting.
Addressing the Problem of Underestimation
A concern here is that the above estimates may be underestimates as the D schools are likely to be
aected by the program to some extent. (Note, though, that the direction of the above eects are correct,
but presumably the eects are even larger than the estimates presented in the above analysis.) Using
the strategy described in section (5.1.5), the correct dierence-in-dierences and regression discontinuity
estimates can be obtained by scaling up the corresponding estimates above by factors of 1.15 and 1.27
respectively.
6.2 Do Threatened Public Schools Focus on the Subject Closest to the Cuto?
Role of Dierences in the Extent of Diculties between Subjects
This section investigates whether the threatened schools facing the \threat of voucher" program chose
to focus on a certain subject area. Table 7 presents the results from estimation of model 4. While
columns (1)-(2) present the results without controls, columns (3)-(4) present those with controls.27 The
rst column of each set reports the results from OLS estimation and the second column from xed
eects estimation.
There is no evidence that the threatened schools concentrated most on the subject closest to the
cuto. The coecients of the relevant interaction terms are actually positive and are never dierent
from zero statistically. Nor are they statistically dierent between themselves, as seen in the last row
of table 7.
In each of the columns, the rst three coecients indicate a decline in the percentage of students
scoring below the minimum criteria cutos in each of the three subjects. However, the decline in writing
27 Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditures
and interactions of the subject dummies with these variables.
27by far exceeds the corresponding declines in the other two subjects. As the p-values indicate, this decline
in writing exceeds the declines in reading and math statistically also. To summarize, this table nds no
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the threatened schools concentrated most on the subject closest
to the cuto. Rather the schools seem to have disproportionately favored FCAT writing. While there
are improvements in each of the three subject areas, the improvement in writing is substantially larger
than that in the other two subject areas both economically and statistically.
Table 8a investigates whether the F schools chose to focus on writing irrespective of its distance from
the cuto (relative to the other subjects). It presents results from estimation of model 5. Columns (1)-
(2) report results from specications without controls, while columns (3)-(4) include controls. There are
declines in the percentage of students scoring below the cutos in each of the three subjects, irrespective
of their distances from the cutos. However, these declines are largest in magnitude for writing and
holds irrespective of whether writing has a rank of \low", \mid" or \high". For example, the decline
in writing for \F" schools which were closest to the cuto in writing (\low" in writing) exceeded the
decline in reading (math) for schools that were \low" in reading (math), \mid" in reading (math) or
\high" in reading (math). The scenario is exactly the same when writing ranks \mid" or \high". Note
that these improvements are not only economically larger, but as table 8b shows, they are statistically
so too. Moreover, the improvements in the dierent subjects do not have a denite hierarchy or a
one-to-one relationship with distances from the cuto.
To sum, the F schools chose to concentrate on writing irrespective of its distance from the cuto,
presumably because it was easiest to improve in. Case studies reported in Goldhaber and Hannaway
(2004) are very much consistent with this picture: `Writing came rst \because this is the easiest to
pass"...\With writing there's a script; it's pretty much rst we did this, then we did this, and nally we
did that, and using that simple sequencing in your writing you would get a passing grade."'
Telephone interviews conducted by me with school administrators in several F schools in dierent
Florida districts also show a similar picture. They reveal widespread beliefs among school adminis-
trators that writing scores were much easier to improve in than reading and math scores. They say
that they focused on writing in various ways after the program. They established a \team approach
in writing" which introduced writing across the curriculum. This approach incorporated writing com-
ponents in other subject areas also such as history, geography, etc. to increase the students' practice
in writing. They also introduced school wide projects in writing, longer time blocks in writing, and
28writing components in lower grades.
6.3 Do Threatened Schools tend to Reclassify Low Performing Students into Ex-
cluded ESE Categories
Total ESE classication
Table 9 looks for relative shifts in total ESE classication after the program. Columns (1)-(2) present
results from model (6), while columns (3)-(4) present results from model (7). There is no evidence of
any post-program shifts in ESE placement for the F schools relative to the D schools. Note that though
the treatment eects are not signicant, they are in most cases positive. Therefore, for each regression
I conduct an F test to examine whether the treatment eects are jointly signicant. As the p-values
show, while the treatment eects are jointly signicant for model (6), they are no longer so for model
(7).
Thus, there is not much evidence in favor of a relative increase in total ESE classication in F
schools after the program. However, absence of shifts in total ESE classication does not preclude the
possibility of relative shifts in excluded categories in F schools. Therefore, to obtain a clearer picture, I
next investigate whether there was an increased classication in excluded categories relative to included
categories in the F schools in comparison to the D schools after program.
Classication in Excluded Categories relative to Included Categories
Table 10 looks at the eect of \threatened status" on classication in excluded categories relative to
included categories. Columns (1) reports the results from estimation of model (9) and column (2) from
it's xed eects counterpart. The results from the model (8) are qualitatively similar and hence not
reported, they are available on request.
There is no statistically signicant evidence of any relative shifts in F schools, either in the included or
in the excluded categories. Since the treatment eects on relative classication in excluded categories are
positive, I also conduct an F-test to check whether they are jointly signicant. As the p-values indicate,
the treatment eects (relative classication in excluded categories) are also not jointly signicant. I also
estimate alternative forms of the above specication as well as model (8) that include district dummies
and interactions of district dummies with year dummies. The results are very similar and hence are
not reported here.28 Figure 8 Panel A looks at the trend in total ESE classication in F and D schools
28 Note that I also experiment with district dummies and interactions of district dummies with year dummies in the
other analyses in this paper|when looking for eects on total ESE classication, investigating focus on specic subject
areas and focus on students below minimum criteria. The results in all cases remain similar to those reported in the paper
29while panel B graphs the trend in relative classication into excluded categories relative to included
categories in F and D schools. Once again, consistent with the results in the previous and this section,
there is no evidence of any relative reclassication in F schools relative to D schools.
Classication in Mutable Excluded Categories relative to Included Categories
The previous analysis does not nd much evidence in favor of relative classication into excluded
categories in F schools. However, this does not rule out the possibility that this kind of behavior took
place in the F schools. This is because increased classication may have taken place in some specic
categories which are more mutable and hence more amenable to manipulation, and consideration of all
excluded categories together masks this kind of behavior. As argued earlier, if such reclassication did
take place, it is most likely to have taken place in the mutable categories such as learning disabled and
emotionally handicapped.
Columns (3)-(4) of table 10 investigate the eect of the program on classication into learning dis-
abled categories relative to included categories in F schools. Although the treatment eects on relative
classication into learning disabled categories in F schools are jointly signicant, they are never statis-
tically signicant individually. Moreover, the magnitude of the eects in each of the three years after
program are small. Columns (5)-(6) examine the eect on such classication in emotionally handicapped
category. There is no evidence of any relative classication into this category in the threatened schools.
To summarize, there is not much evidence in favor of a relative increase in classication in excluded
categories in the treated schools. However, these eects may be contaminated by other factors such as
the presence of pre-existing trends. I consider these issues below to check the sensitivity/robustness of
the above ndings.
Looking for pre-existing trends in ESE classication
Using data from 1993 through 1997, table 11 investigates the existence of pre-program trends in ESE
classication in F schools relative to D schools. Columns (1)-(2) nd no evidence of dierential pre-
program trends in F schools in total ESE classication. Columns (3)-(4) investigate the existence of
dierential pre-program trends in excluded categories relative to included categories in F schools (in
comparison to D schools), columns (5)-(6) look for such dierential trends in learning disabled and
columns (7)-(8) in emotionally handicapped. There is no evidence that F schools tended to reclassify
dierentially in excluded categories (or mutable excluded categories) relative to the D schools before
and hence are omitted. They are available on request.
30the program. To summarize, table 11 nds no evidence that the above post-program eects are biased
by the existence of pre-program trends.
Regression Discontinuity Analysis: Examining the eect of Program on ESE Placement
Using discontinuity samples 1 and 2, table 12 investigates the eect of \threatened status" on total
ESE placement. The results are qualitatively similar to those in the full sample. Although the xed
eects estimates show positive and signicant treatment eects in the rst year, the eects in the
second and third years are no longer signicant. Note that while the treatment eects are jointly
signicant in the OLS regressions, they jointly never reach standard levels of signicance in the xed
eects regressions. Using the same discontinuity samples, table 13 investigates the eect of the program
on relative classication in to excluded categories in F schools (relative to D schools). Columns (1)-(2)
show that there is no statistically signicant evidence that the F schools resorted to classication in to
excluded categories, except in the rst year after program for discontinuity sample 2. I also conduct
an F test to check the joint signicance of these eects. As the p-values reveal, these eects are never
jointly signicant.
Columns (5)-(8) investigate the eect of the \threatened status" on relative classication in the mu-
table excluded categories|learning disabled (columns (3)-(4)) and emotionally handicapped (columns
(5)-(6)). Once again, there is no evidence that F schools resorted to such reclassication after the
program.
Looking at the Eect of \Threatened Status" on Percentage of Students Tested
Another way to investigate whether such reclassication took place is to look for a shift in the percentage
of students tested. If F schools tended to classify low performing students into excluded special education
categories, this would lead to a decrease in the percentage of students tested. Table 14 investigates this
issue. Using data on percentage of students tested in reading, math and writing during 1998-2002, it
nds no evidence of a relative decline in percentage of students tested in either of the three years after
program and in either of the subject areas tested. This further conrms the above nding.29
Thus there is not much evidence that the F schools tended to dierentially classify low performing
students in to excluded ESE categories. But this does not mean that the schools did not respond to
29 Note that no change in percentage of students tested is consistent with an increased classication in to excluded ESE
categories if the school increases the percentage of regular students tested. The school would resort to such a behavior
only if the latter group of students are expected to score better than those reclassied in to excluded ESE categories. Both
of these are quite stringent conditions. Moreover, it is not clear why the comparatively low performing students would
choose to take the test while the comparatively better students would choose not to take it in the rst place.
31incentives. As discussed in the theoretical section, there are multiple ways in which the threatened
schools can respond|they weigh the relative returns and costs in the dierent alternatives and choose
the options that are least costly. The fact that they did not resort to such reclassication indicates that
its costs did not justify its returns. Increased classication means increased provision of services which
is often costly in spite of state nancing of a large part of these services. Moreover, such classication
has to be approved by the parents and a group of experts and too much reclassication might lead to
audits by the Florida department of education. The existence of the McKay Scholarship program acts
as a further deterrent to such classication. Since this program makes every disabled student in Florida
public schools eligible for vouchers, reclassication is associated with a risk of loss of these students and
a corresponding risk of loss of revenue.
Reclassication into ESE categories: Addressing the Problem of Underestimation
As discussed earlier, both the dierence-in-dierences and the regression discontinuity are likely
to be underestimates because the D schools are likely to be aected by the program. This issue is
more of a problem here because one might argue that the above absence of any robust evidence in
favor of reclassication is driven by the fact that the D schools are not completely untreated. To
circumvent this problem, I use the strategy described in sections (5.1.5) and (5.3.7). Using this strategy,
the correct dierence-in-dierences estimates can be obtained by scaling up the above dierence-in-
dierences estimates by a factor of 1.15, while the correct regression discontinuity estimates can be
obtained by scaling up the corresponding estimates above by a factor of 1.27. Using the estimates in
tables 9-10 and 12-13, it can be seen that the scaled up eects would still be very small and would
always be less than 1.17%. This further serves to reinforce the above nding that there is not much
evidence in favor of relative reclassication into special education categories by F schools.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the behavior of public schools facing vouchers. It focuses on the 1999 Florida
opportunity scholarship program. Utilizing the institutional details of the program, it analyzes the
incentives built into the system, and examines the behavior of public schools facing these incentives.
It focuses on three alternative ways in which the program incentives might have induced the threat-
ened schools to behave. First, certain percentages of a school's students had to score above some
pre-designated thresholds on the score scale to escape the second F grade and hence vouchers. As a
32result, did the threatened schools tend to focus more on students below these cutos rather than equally
on all students? Second, as per the program details, to avoid an F grade, schools needed to pass the
minimum criteria in only one of the three subjects. Did this induce schools to focus more on one subject
area rather than equally on all? If so, did they choose to focus on the subject area closest to the high
stakes cutos? Alternatively, did they choose to focus on a specic subject that is perceived to be the
easiest irrespective of the distances of the subject areas from the thresholds? Third, scores of students
in certain special education categories were not eligible to be included in the calculation of grades. Did
this rule induce the F schools to reclassify their low performing students in to these excluded categories
so as to articially inate scores?
While there is not much evidence that the threatened schools resorted to such reclassication (there
were substantial costs to this, as outlined in the paper), I nd robust evidence that they concentrated
more on students expected to score just below the high stakes cutos and focused much more on writing
compared to reading and math. The latter is consistent with the notion among Florida administrators
that writing scores are considerably easier to improve than scores in reading and math. Moreover,
although the threatened schools focused more on students expected to score below the minimum criteria
cutos, the improvement of the lower performing students does not seem to have come at the expense
of the higher performing ones. Rather, there seems to have been a rightward shift of the entire score
distribution in each of reading, math and writing with improvements more concentrated in score ranges
just below the minimum criteria cutos.
These ndings are very informative from a policy point of view. They strongly suggest that the F
schools responded to the incentives built into the system. This implies that policy can be appropriately
targeted to carve public school behavior and to induce schools to behave in desirable ways. For example,
if more attention on reading and math is warranted, it calls for a change in grading rules to give less
weight to writing and more to reading and math. If more attention on comparatively higher performing
students is desired, in addition to emphasis on low performing students, this calls for an inclusion of
higher performing student scores in computation of F and D grades. Interestingly, two of the major
elements of the grading criteria changes that went into eect in 2002 were to reduce the weight of
writing and to increase those of reading and math; and extension of emphasis to scores of comparatively
higher performing students also. In contrast, the rules relating to the inclusion of the dierent special
education categories in grade formation did not change.
33Eective policy making calls for an understanding of the responses of agents to specic rules of the
policy, so that the lessons learnt can be used to create a more eective and stronger policy. This paper
has contributed to this learning process and the ndings promise to be valuable from the point of view
of public school reform.
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35Table 1: Eect of \Threatened Status" on percentage of students scoring in levels 1-5
(Sample of treated F and control D schools, Reading, Math and Writing)
Reading Math Writing
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







(1.25) (1.23) (1.44) (1.43) (1.27) (1.25)





(0.88) (0.87) (0.75) (0.74) (0.92) (0.93)







(0.73) (0.72) (1.23) (1.22) (1.26) (1.24)




(0.70) (0.69) (0.42) (0.43) (2.60) (2.59)





(0.14) (0.12) (0.22) (0.21) (0.46) (0.45)







(1.35) (1.33) (1.79) (1.78) (1.20) (1.21)







(0.87) (0.88) (0.96) (0.95) (1.17) (1.18)







(1.07) (1.05) (1.00) (0.99) (2.21) (2.23)
Treated * level 4 * 2 years after program 0.58 0.57 1.24 1.25 5.70
 5.71

(0.46) (0.47) (0.78) (0.80) (2.53) (2.50)
Treated * level 5 * 2 years after program -0.92
 -0.91
 -0.16 -0.17 1.26 1.27

(0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.95) (0.93)







(1.25) (1.26) (1.74) (1.73) (1.06) (1.07)







(0.74) (0.73) (0.86) (0.85) (1.34) (1.35)
Treated * level 3 * 3 years after program 3.18
 3.17
 0.44 0.44 12.95
 12.97

(0.84) (0.82) (0.69) (0.69) (1.60) (1.60)
Treated * level 4 * 3 years after program 0.45 0.45 0.10 0.10 5.60
 5.63

(0.60) (0.60) (0.80) (0.79) (1.72) (1.71)
Treated * level 5 * 3 years after program -0.99
 -0.98
 -0.13 -0.12 0.19 0.21
(0.35) (0.34) (0.55) (0.52) (0.63) (0.61)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 10110 10110 10035 10035 10105 10105
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in
parentheses. The dependent variable is percentage of students in school i scoring in level j in year t. The regression results are obtained
from estimation of model 1 and its xed eects counterpart. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. All regressions
include level dummies and interactions of the level dummies with treated dummy and year dummies respectively. The FE columns include
school xed eects. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditures
and interactions of level dummies with each of these variables.Table 2: Pre-program trend of F schools in levels 1-5, relative to D schools
(Reading, Math and Writing)
Reading Math Writing
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * level 1 * trend 0.65 0.66 0.76 0.88 0.39 0.44
(1.60) (1.43) (1.58) (1.74) (0.67) (1.07)
Treated * level 2 * trend -0.06 -0.05 1.48
 1.61 0.35 0.40
(0.68) (1.32) (0.90) (1.64) (0.35) (0.77)
Treated * level 3 * trend -0.39 -0.34
(0.56) (0.75)
Treated * level 4 * trend -0.16 -0.11
(0.10) (0.24)
Treated * level 5 * trend -0.09 -0.04
(0.05) (0.10)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2030 2030 2020 2020 7150 7150
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district
are in parentheses. The dependent variable is percentage of students in school i scoring in level j in year t. All regressions are
weighted by the number of students tested. All regressions include level dummies, interactions of level dummies with treated dummy
and trend respectively. The FE columns include school xed eects. This table reports results from estimation of model 2 and its
xed eects counterpart. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil
expenditures and interactions of level dummies with each of these variables. Pre-program data are available only for levels 1 and 2
in reading and math.Table 3: Mean reversion of the 98F schools in relation to 98D schools
(Reading and Math, 1998-99)
dep. var. = % of students scoring in level i in school j in year t, i = f1,2g
Reading Math
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
98F * level 1 * trend -1.70 -1.59 -1.72 0.64 0.26 0.25
(1.52) (1.51) (1.25) (1.88) (1.98) (1.50)
98F * level 2 * trend 0.50 0.41 0.27 2.21 2.09 2.06
(0.89) (0.90) (1.07) (1.35) (1.38) (1.38)
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Observations 2728 2710 2710 2728 2710 2710
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school
district are in parentheses. The dependent variable is percentage of students in school i scoring in level j in year t. All
regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. The table uses the sample of 98F and 98D schools. Pre-program
data are available only for levels 1 and 2 in reading and math. Regressions include level dummies, interactions of level
dummies with treated dummy and trend respectively. The FE columns include school xed eects. Controls include race, sex,
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditures and interactions of level dummies
with each of these variables.Table 4: Pre-program (1999) characteristics of F and D schools in Regression Discontinuity samples
Discontinuity sample 1 Discontinuity sample 2
F D F-D F D F-D
(std. dev.) (std. dev.) [p-value] (std. dev.) (std. dev.) [p-value]
% black 64.68 63.45 1.23 66.39 62.40 3.99
(28.39) (26.47) [0.84] (27.96) (27.18) [0.55]
% hispanic 17.99 19.52 -1.53 16.52 20.40 -3.88
(20.86) (21.72) [0.75] (18.15) (22.09) [0.45]
% white 16.42 15.52 0.90 16.15 15.62 0.53
(18.81) (18.24) [0.83] (17.78) (18.28) [0.90]
% asian 0.47 0.69 -0.23 0.55 0.80 -0.25
(0.70) (1.04) [0.47] (0.75) (1.88) [0.54]
% american indian 0.19 0.31 -0.11 0.10 0.30 -0.20
(0.70) (1.24) [0.64] (0.38) (1.21) [0.43]
% male 51.22 52.18 -0.96 51.35 51.87 -0.51
(4.00) (5.07) [0.37] (4.43) (5.12) [0.69]
% free lunch eligible 86.3 85 1.29 85.48 84.60 0.87
(8.34) (11.38) [0.58] (8.56) (11.46) [0.74]
% ESE 16.20 15.39 0.84 15.51 15.29 0.22
(5.40) (5.70) [0.51] (5.35) (5.62) [0.87]
% in Excluded ESE categories 11.94 11.20 0.73 11.47 11.15 0.32
(5.20) (5.71) [0.56] (5.18) (5.58) [0.81]
% in Included ESE categories 4.27 4.16 0.10 4.05 4.14 -0.10
(1.87) (1.73) [0.80] (1.45) (1.73) [0.81]
% real per pupil expenditure 32.07 30.72 1.35 31.33 30.69 0.65
(5.58) (5.72) [0.29] (5.56) (6.09) [0.66]
FCAT reading score 246.97 246.43 0.53 248 246.46 1.54
(16.28) (16.11) [0.88] (14.29) (15.73) [0.68]
# tested in reading 99.97 104.08 -4.11 102.92 104 -1.08
(27.05) (34.67) [0.57] (27.45) (33.91) [0.89]
FCAT math score 266.19 268.19 -2.00 266.29 268.64 -2.35
(14.15) (15.21) [0.55] (14.90) (15.06) [0.52]
# tested in math 95.53 101.68 -6.15 99.17 102.09 -2.92
(24.90) (38.28) [0.42] (26.29) (37.35) [0.73]
FCAT writing score 2.44 2.53 -0.09 2.46 2.53 -0.08
(0.13) (0.12) [0.00] (0.13) (0.12) [0.01]
# tested in writing 100.75 104.40 -3.65 104.04 104.27 -0.23
(26.54) (34.91) [0.61] (27.97) (34.30) [0.98]Table 5: Regression Discontinuity Analysis:
Eect of \Threatened Status" on percentage of students scoring in levels 1-5, Reading, Math and Writing
Reading Math Writing
D. S. 1
1 D. S. 2 D. S. 1 D. S. 2 D. S. 1 D. S. 2
FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





(2.23) (2.21) (1.99) (1.76) (1.64) (1.23)
Treated * level 2 * 1 year after program -1.11 -1.53 -0.04 -0.16 -8.46
 -7.99

(0.98) (1.31) (1.79) (2.04) (1.72) (2.04)
Treated * level 3 * 1 year after program 0.31 0.93 2.34 2.86
 3.05 2.10
(1.69) (1.55) (1.26) (1.26) (1.99) (2.14)







(0.83) (0.96) (1.22) (1.27) (2.93) (2.95)




(0.36) (0.45) (0.23) (0.23) (0.85) (0.96)







(2.38) (2.43) (2.30) (1.93) (1.76) (1.74)
Treated * level 2 * 2 years after program 1.64 2.00 2.65 3.24 -3.50
 -4.34

(1.39) (1.37) (1.97) (2.23) (2.00) (1.85)
Treated * level 3 * 2 years after program 0.91 1.49 2.00 2.27
 4.99 3.80
(1.82) (1.79) (0.83) (0.94) (3.04) (2.43)





(0.83) (0.86) (1.70) (1.89) (3.58) (3.27)
Treated * level 5 * 2 years after program 0.28 0.24 0.91
 1.10
 1.51 2.07
(0.59) (0.67) (0.36) (0.33) (1.19) (1.32)







(2.48) (3.31) (3.08) (3.12) (1.81) (1.65)
Treated * level 2 * 3 years after program 0.67 1.20 2.07 0.42 -6.38
 -7.92

(1.72) (1.98) (1.63) (1.57) (2.28) (1.99)
Treated * level 3 * 3 years after program -0.02 0.87 1.08 1.92 2.20 2.11
(2.33) (2.53) (1.49) (1.61) (4.19) (4.01)





(1.08) (1.18) (1.99) (1.98) (3.40) (3.58)
Treated * level 5 * 3 years after program 0.13 0.16 1.04 1.36 2.56
 3.07

(0.47) (0.57) (1.07) (1.19) (0.65) (0.76)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1645 1565 1645 1565 1645 1565
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in
parentheses. The dependent variable is percentage of students in school i scoring in level j in year t. 1 D.S. stands for discontinuity sample.
All regressions include school xed eects, level dummies and interactions of the level dummies with treated dummies and year dummies
respectively. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditures and
interactions of level dummies with each of these variables. The results from OLS are similar and hence not reported. These OLS regressions
also include a polynomial in the selection variable, the percentage of students scoring at or above level 3 in writing.Table 6: The Issue of Sorting: Investigating demographic shifts
(Sample of F and D schools, 1994-2002)
% white % black % hispanic % asian % american % free/reduced price
indian lunch eligible
FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * program dummy -1.64 -0.55 1.99
 -0.04 0.01 -0.16
(1.12) (1.11) (0.95) (0.18) (0.10) (1.27)
Treated * program * trend 0.84 -0.92 0.20 0.02 -0.01 -0.54
(0.61) (0.57) (0.53) (0.08) (0.04) (0.92)
Observations 4498 4498 4498 4498 4498 3076
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school
district are in parentheses.The dependent variable is the relevant demographic characteristic of school i in year t. This table
reports results from the estimation of the xed eects counterpart of model 3. All regressions include school xed eects and also
include trend, program dummy, interactions of trend with treated dummy and program dummy respectively.Table 7: Do Threatened Public Schools focus on the subject closest to cuto?
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)





(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)





(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)





(0.20) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23)
Low * 1 year after program 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.23
(0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Mid * 1 year after program 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19
(0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
Controls N N Y Y
Observations 390 390 378 378
p-values of dierences:
(Reading * 1 year after - Writing * 1 year after) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Math * 1 year after - Writing * 1 year after) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Low * 1 year after - Mid * 1 year after) 0.61 0.62 0.29 0.30
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by
school district are in parentheses. This table uses percentage of students below minimum criteria in reading, math
and writing, each standardized by grade, subject and year to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. The
dependent variable is percentage of students below minimum criteria cuto (standardized by grade, subject and year)
in school i in subject s in year t. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. The regresion results
are obtained from the estimation of model 4 and its xed eects counterpart. The OLS columns include the three
subject dummies, low and mid dummies. The FE columns include school xed eects, two subject dummies and low
and mid dummies. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches, real
per pupil expenditure and interactions of the subject dummies with these variables.Table 8a: Further delineating the behavior of public schools: Does subject rank matter?
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low * Reading * Year 2000 -0.85
 -0.47
 -0.22 -0.21
(0.15) (0.23) (0.20) (0.31)
Low * Math * Year 2000 -0.26 -0.02 0.01 -0.08
(0.20) (0.15) (0.25) (0.21)





(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Mid * Reading * Year 2000 0.01 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09
(0.07) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)





(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)





(0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.24)





(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)





(0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)





(0.27) (0.30) (0.31) (0.41)
Controls N N Y Y
Observations 390 390 378 378
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
by school district are in parentheses. This table uses percentage of students below minimum criteria in reading,
math and writing, each standardized by grade, subject and year to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of
1. The dependent variable is percentage of students below minimum criteria cuto (standardized by grade, subject
and year) in school i in subject s in year t. All regressions are weighted by the number of students tested. The OLS
columns include the three subject dummies, low and mid dummies. The FE columns include school xed eects, two
subject dummies and low and mid dummies. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or
reduced-price lunches, real per pupil expenditure and interaction of the subject dummies with these variables. The
regression results are obtained from the estimation of model 5 and its xed eects counterpart.Table 8b: Further delineating the behavior of public schools:
Does subject rank matter?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p-values of dierences:
(Low * Writing * Year 2000) - (Low * Reading * Year 2000) 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.01
(Low * Writing * Year 2000) - (Low * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Low * Writing * Year 2000) - (Mid * Reading * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Low * Writing * Year 2000) - (Mid * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Low * Writing * Year 2000) - (High * Reading * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Low * Writing * Year 2000) - (High * Math * Year 2000) 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00
(Mid * Writing * Year 2000) - (Mid * Reading * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Mid * Writing * Year 2000) - (Mid * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(Mid * Writing * Year 2000) - (Low * Reading * Year 2000) 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Mid * Writing * Year 2000) - (Low * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Mid * Writing * Year 2000) - (High * Reading * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Mid * Writing * Year 2000) - (High * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01
(High * Writing * Year 2000) - (High * Reading * Year 2000) 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.10
(High * Writing * Year 2000) - (High * Math * Year 2000) 0.21 0.39 0.31 0.37
(High * Writing * Year 2000) - (Low * Reading * Year 2000) 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10
(High * Writing * Year 2000) - (Low * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05
(High * Writing * Year 2000) - (Mid * Reading * Year 2000) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
(High * Writing * Year 2000) - (Mid * Math * Year 2000) 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.10
Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively correspond to columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) of table 8a. P-values
reported give the p-values of the F-tests that the dierences of the corresponding coecients in table 8a are
zero.Table 9: Eect of \Threatened Status" on total ESE/Special Education placement
(Sample of treated F and control D schools, 1998-2002)
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Program dummy 0.11 0.09
(0.23) (0.25)
Program dummy * trend -0.29 -0.23
(0.28) (0.27)
Treated * Program dummy 0.53 0.33
(0.43) (0.41)
Treated * Program dummy * trend 0.51 0.56
(0.51) (0.49)
Treated * 1 year after program 0.59 0.43
(0.39) (0.37)
Treated * 2 years after program 0.79 0.73
(0.49) (0.52)
Treated * 3 years after program 0.78 0.73
(0.59) (0.65)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year dummies N N Y Y
Observations 2553 2553 2553 2553
p-value
1 0.05 0.08 0.46 0.57
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
1 p-value of F-test of joint signicance of treatment
eects on treated schools. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. The
dependent variable is percentage ESE membership in school i in year t. Columns (1)-(2) report results from estimation
of model (6), columns (3)-(4) from model 7. OLS columns include treated dummy, FE columns include school xed
eects. Columns (1)-(2) also include trend, program dummy, interaction of trend with treated dummy and interaction
of program dummy with trend. Columns (3)-(4) include year dummies and interaction of D1 dummy (D1 = 1 if year
 1999) with treated dummy. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price
lunches and grade distribution of students.Table 10: Eect of \Threatened Status" on classication in excluded relative to included categories
(Sample of treated F and control D schools, 1998-2002)
All Excluded Mutable Excluded
Versus Included Versus Included
Learning Disabled Emotionally Handicapped
Versus Included Versus Included
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * 1 year after program 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05
(0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Treated * 2 years after program 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06
(0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Treated * 3 years after program 0.36 0.34 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.28
(0.18) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24)
Exempt * treated * 1 year after program 0.27 0.27 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.32) (0.34) (0.23) (0.24) (0.14) (0.14)
Exempt * treated * 2 years after program 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.47 -0.04 -0.04
(0.53) (0.56) (0.39) (0.41) (0.22) (0.24)
Exempt * treated * 3 years after program 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.13 -0.25 -0.25
(0.70) (0.71) (0.49) (0.52) (0.22) (0.23)
Observations 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
p-value1 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.29 0.33
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1p-value of F-test of the program eect on relative
classication in excluded categories in treated schools. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are
in parentheses. The dependent variable is percentage of students in school i classied in category j in year t. LD stands for
learning disabled category and EH for emotionally handicapped category. All columns report results from the unrestricted
model (9). Results from model (8) are similar and hence not reported. The FE columns include school xed eects while the
OLS columns include a treated dummy. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price
lunches and grade-distribution of students.Table 11: Pre-program Trend of D and F Schools, 1993-97
(Total Special Education Classication, Excluded relative to Included categories and Mutable Excluded relative to
Included categories)
Total ESE Classication All Excl. categories Mutable excluded categories
vs. Included vs Included
LD EH
vs. Included vs. Included
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treated * trend -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.13) (0.90) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Exempt * treated * trend -0.09 -0.09 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 -0.09
(0.12) (0.23) (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.14)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2450 2450 4900 4900 4900 4900 4900 4900
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school
district are in parentheses. OLS columns include an F dummy, FE columns include school xed eects. The dependent
variable in columns (1)-(2) is percentage ESE membership in school i in year t, the dependent variable in columns (3)-(8) is
percentage of students in school i classied in category j in year t. All columns include trend, columns (3)-(8) also include
an Exempt dummy and interactions of Exempt dummy with trend and treated dummies respectively. LD and EH stand for
learning disabled and emotionally handicapped respectively. Controls include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free
or reduced-price lunches and grade distribution of students.Table 12: Regression Discontinuity Analysis:
Eect of \Threatened Status" on total ESE placement
Discontinuity Sample 1 Discontinuity Sample 2
OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated * 1 year after program 0.52 0.69
 0.78 0.92

(0.48) (0.35) (0.51) (0.40)
Treated * 2 years after program 0.00 0.31 0.14 0.70
(0.87) (0.81) (0.81) (0.57)
Treated * 3 years after program 0.38 0.52 0.43 1.01
(0.99) (0.90) (1.00) (0.87)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
Observations 415 415 395 395
p-value
1 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.19
,
,
: signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
1 p-value of F-test of joint signicance of treatment
eects on treated schools. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. The
OLS columns include a treated dummy, the FE columns include school xed eects. The OLS columns include a
cubic in the selection variable, the percentage of students scoring at or above level 3 in writing. All columns include
year dummies and interaction of D1 dummy (D1 = 1 if year  1999) with treated dummy. Controls include race,
sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and grade distribution of students.Table 13: Regression Discontinuity Analysis: Eect of \Threatened Status" on classication in excluded relative to
included categories
All Excl. categories vs. Incl. Mutable Excluded categories vs Included
D. S. 1 D. S. 2 LD vs. Included EH vs. Included
D. S. 1 D. S. 2 D. S. 1 D. S. 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * 1 year after program 0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)
Treated * 2 years after program 0.33 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.00
(0.41) (0.32) (0.30) (0.24) (0.31) (0.26)
Treated * 3 years after program 0.50 0.52 0.10 0.25 0.06 0.19
(0.77) (0.75) (0.67) (0.63) (0.63) (0.59)
Exempt * treated * 1 year after program 0.55 0.87 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.29
(0.42) (0.46) (0.20) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21)
Exempt * treated * 2 years after program -0.35 -0.30 -0.03 0.08 -0.11 0.07
(0.86) (0.63) (0.47) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Exempt * treated * 3 years after program -0.47 -0.02 0.06 0.30 -0.12 -0.06
(1.33) (1.21) (0.74) (0.81) (0.66) (0.70)
Observations 830 790 830 790 830 790
p-value1 0.17 0.18 0.99 0.88 0.53 0.46
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 1 p-value of F-test of joint signicance of treatment eects on treated schools.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. LD and EH stand for learning disabled and emotionally
handicapped respectively. All columns include school xed eects and report results from xed eects counterpart of model (9). Controls include
race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and grade-distribution of students. The results from OLS are similar and
hence not reported. These OLS regressions also include a polynomial in the selection variable, the percentage of students scoring at or above level 3
in writing.Table 14: Eect of \Threatened Status" on percentage of students tested
(Sample of treated F and control D schools, Reading, Math and Writing)
Reading Math Writing
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated * 1 year after program -0.60 -0.69 -1.15 -1.12 0.15 0.12
(0.94) (1.04) (0.93) (1.06) (0.89) (0.93)
Treated * 2 years after program 0.74 0.11 0.75 0.53 0.62 0.64
(1.24) (1.11) (0.99) (1.00) (1.31) (0.94)
Treated * 3 years after program 0.34 -0.07 0.17 0.10 0.68 0.46
(0.93) (1.10) (1.32) (1.11) (0.82) (0.90)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2525 2525 2511 2511 4491 4491
p-value 0.29 0.90 0.03 0.44 0.62 0.89
, , : signicant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clus-
tering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year dummies and interactions of year dummies with
treated dummy. The OLS columns include a treated dummy, the FE columns include school xed eects. Controls
include race, sex, percentage of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and real per pupil expenditure.Figure 1. Distribution of percentage of students in level 1 Reading, level 1 Math 
and level 2 Writing, F and D Schools, 1999 and 2000 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of Reading, Math and Writing Score for F and D schools    
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Figure 5. Percentage of students in levels 1-5, FCAT Writing, F and D schools                                Figure 6. Regression Discontinuity Analysis:  
Relationship between % of students at or above 3 in writing and Treatment Status  
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6 Figure 7. Regression Discontinuity Analysis: 
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55 Figure 8. Classification into ESE Categories, F and D schools 
Panel A. Total ESE Classification 
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Panel B. Classification into Excluded Relative to Included ESE Categories 
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